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The Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act in Montana*
tEDWIN W. BRIGGS
INTRODUCTION
In 1951, the Montana Legislature enacted the Uniform Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Support Act1 designed to correct one of
the most serious and aggravating evils that has developed in our
American society-the regular desertion of families, by the
breadwinner, with the attendant refusal to help financially to
provide support for the wife and children. In this instance, the
ease with which the culprit can slip over state boundaries has
created seemingly insurmountable obstacles to providing effec-
tive procedures to compel the deserting husband or father to sup-
port. Hence, the phenomenal success which the domestic rela-
tions courts are reported to be having under this Act, and under
*1 want to use this opportunity to express my appreciation to the district
court judges and to those county attorneys participating, for the many
replies to my letter inquiring about their experience with this Act, and
asking them to respond to an inclosed questionnaire. The matter dis-
cussed herein is based in large part upon and is colored by their com-
ments; so I hope they will consider this paper a collective response to
their observations. The study is intended primarily to be provocative,
generally making little attempt to give final answers to the many ques-
tions raised by the Reciprocal Act.
tProfessor of Law, Montana State University.
1R.C.M. 1947, Section 94-901-1, to 94-901-18. In referring to particular
Sections in the Act, in our discussion, generally we shall refer to them
by the last number in the citation, the particular section number, gen-
erally corresponding to the number in the original draft Uniform Act.
The Act is classified here under Title 94, as part of the Criminal Code,
-a most questionable classification to be considered infra.
By September, 1953, forty-six states and five territories had adopted one
of the two principal reciprocal Acts, or a slight variation thereof, the
most remarkable adoption record for a Uniform Act by far, of any yet
approved. Finally, the Canadian provinces also have adopted a similar
Act called the "Uniform Maintenance Orders Act." The term "recipro-
cal" requires that both states involved have enacted this or "substan-
tially similar" legislation providing for compliance with the other's re-
quest. Though the Acts in the United States generally have been con-
sidered nearly enough alike to qualify for reciprocal treatment, some of
them vary substantially enough in certain respects to raise a question as
to their "reciprocal" quality. A careful comparison with the Canadian
Act has not yet been made, but it has been urged that cooperative efforts
be made to establish reciprocal treatment. See, Reciprocal Sta~te Legi8-
lation to Enforce the Support of Dependents 22, (1953), published by
The Council of State Governments, 1313 East 60th St., Chicago 37, Ill.
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a very similar act, first adopted in the State of New York,' in
1949, in bringing the deserter to "time," in the overwhelming
majority of cases, appears to be almost a miracle.
Notwithstanding the very substantial success of this legisla-
tion, especially in the highly industrialized areas, a large majority
of the lawyers and district court judges in Montana having had
some experience with our Act, are highly critical. By analyz-
ing the Act at some length, we hope to establish what part of this
opposition may be founded on basic defects in the Act itself, and
what part may be obviated simply by increasing understanding
of and practice under the Act. To this end, it is necessary that
we first have in mind, the traditional legal limitations which make
it possible for any foreign state to be such a haven for the de-
serter. These limitations arise from "obvious" simple principles.
HISTORY OF THE ACT
As to the support of children, though it is recognized general-
ly that a parent has a duty to support, based both on the relation-
ship, and on the interest of the state and the community in the
welfare of its children, some courts insist that it is a moral duty
only.' Though the large majority insist there is a legal duty as
well,' direct enforcement of that duty, even at the residence of the
dependent, has been very limited and uncertain, for many rea-
sons.' Heretofore, the principal sanctions utilized have been
those giving effect to the "public" interest in the problems, i.e.,
the criminal sanction,' and that often contained in juvenile de-
linquent laws, providing that, within the limits of its jurisdiction
'McK. Unconsol. Sections 2111-2120. (McKinney's Cons. Laws of N. Y.
Bk. 65).
'Freeman v. Robinson (1876) 38 N.J.L. 383, 20 Am. Rep. 399; Kelly v.
Davis, 49 N.H. 176, 6 Am. Rep. 499, leading case in the U. S. Both of
these cases were suits by merchants for the supplying of necessities.
They both recognize the moral obligation, but deny the legal. 39 AM.
Ju., Parent and Child, Section 35.
'Dunbar v. Dunbar (1903) 190 US 340, 47 L ed 1084, 23 S Ct 757; Fischer
v. Fischer (1953) 24 N.J. Super 180, 93 A. 2d. 788, fully recognizing com-
mon law liability, reversing early N.J. rule; Barrett v. Barrett, (1934)
44 Ariz. 509, 39 P. (2d) 621; Pac. Gold Dredging Co. v. Ind. Acci. Com.
1921) 184 Cal. 462, 194 p. 1, 13 A.L.R. 725; 39 Am. Juu., Parent and
Child, Section 35, p. 31.
'The legal impossibility for one spouse to sue the other was a complete
bar for the wife. But the almost equally strong policy against suits be-
tween members of a family, disturbing domestic tranquility equally
barred the children. Of course, these legal principles continued to cast
a cloud over the ideas of there being a legal duty at all. Even when
statutes were passed clearly stating the duty, they rarely contained ex-
press provisions for civil remedies to overcome the old rule against fam-
ily suits.
'R.C.M. 1947, 94-301-94-306.
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over juvenile delinquents, a court may exact subsistence from the
parents, for the juvenile.' But even these remedies obviously
are available only for resident dependents. At the conflict of
laws level, there has developed little practice of enforcing duties
of support on behalf of other states or countries.!
As to the duty to support a wife, the law has implemented
that duty somewhat more fully-but not by the common law'
Liability of the husband for necessities, gives the wife no direct
right, but rather a derivative one only enforced by the supplier
of each necessity. Here the duty is enforced directly, principally
as an incident to a divorce, or a separate maintenance action
where allowed. Although, where she is allowed to sue at all,
many American courts have developed the principle that equity
should take direct jurisdiction to grant the wife relief, on the
ground that her legal remedies are so inadequate," even here
such relief quite generally is limited to cases where the forum is
the residence of the obligee. Here likewise, there has been little
tendency in the past, for one state to assist another in the en-
forcement of its duties of support.'
And so, by the simple expedient of crossing a state line, with-
out even leaving the metropolitan district, in some localities, the
derelict father could gain complete practical immunity from all
'R.C.M. 1947, Sections 10-501-10-513 (dependent and neglected chil-
dren) ; and Sections 10-616 (incidental to a juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding.)
8 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Section 458 Comment a (1934), states
the traditional attitude succinctly thus: "The duty of support is im-
posed by a state as an enforcement of its own public policy. Whether
the duty is criminal or civil in character, its enforcement is of no special
interest to other states and since the duty is not imposed primarily for
the benefit of an individual, it is not enforceable elsewhere under the
principles of the Conflict of Laws."
9The RESTATEMENT, Zoo. cit. supra, 8, recognizes the fact that a "quasi-
contractual" duty for necessities, created by one state, will be enforced
in another, but this is altogether inadequate. The extent to which even
equitable relief will be granted even under the broad statutes seemingly
imposing the duty to support generally, has varied greatly. See 27 AM.
JuR., Husband and Wife, Section 402.
'*Edgerton v. Edgerton (1892), 12 Mont. 122, 29 P. 966, 16 LRA 94, 33
Am. St. Rep. 557; Wood v. Wood (1952) 258 Ala. 72, 61 So. 2nd 436.
Child support may be thus enforced also, but only incidentally to the
wife's primary right.
nThis statement must, of course, except a suit for accrued alimony, based
on a foreign judgment, under the full faith and credit clause: Sistare v.
Sistare (1910), 218 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 682, 54 L Ed 905. Lynde v. Lynde
(1901) 181 U.S. 183, 21 S Ct. 555, 45 L Ed 810. But even here, it is Im-
portant to bear in mind that some foreign support decrees, supporting
an action for past due support money, are not entitled to enforcement
because of restrictions on'them imposed by the foreign law itself. Maxim
v. Maxim (1952) 118 N.Y. S 541 well illustrates this in pointing out
that a Family Court support order, for New York City, by its own Judi-
cial code, is not entitled to full faith and credit in a sister State.
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duties of support imposed at the family residence. All he need
do was to stay in a different state from that where his family
lived.
A recent popular article on the subject states the difficulty
of the problem thus: "Many great minds sought a cure. The
American Bar Association, the Children's Bureau of the Federal
Security Agency, the Federal Department of Justice, members
of Congress, family-court judges and leaders in welfare work, all
tried to find a legal wonder drug, and failed. The racket ap-
peared to be unbeatable.'"' That same article credits a Mrs.
Grace Seaman, wife of a judge's secretary, with being responsible
for the reciprocal support acts. It summarizes her tribulations
thus when she appealed to the above authorities:
" ' It's hopeless,' authorities told her. 'We'ye tried
to get a bill through Congress, but it's unconstitutional.
The Government can't order one state to act as a col-
lecting agency for another.' . . . She wrote literally to
every social agency ... to charity organizations ... to
leading judges, lawyers and legislators. Not one would
let her come and talk with him .... She wrote to Mrs.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and after three months the De-
partment of Justice and the Children's Bureau gave the
answer that came generally from one and all, 'We
know all about it. Nothing can be done! ... at the end
of four years the only encouragement she had received
was a statement from a group of Brooklyn lawyers en-
dorsing her crusade 'in principle,' but refusing any ac-
tive aid.... The upturn came in 1945, when Miles F.
McDonald was elected district attorney and became her
boss.... Now, backed by a big name, Mrs. Seaman found
appointments easy to get and influential folks not so
hard to convince .... To detour the unconstitutionality
of a Federal law, a reciprocal state law was produced
... the act was passed by the New York State legislature
(in 1949). . . . To spread the word to the other states,
the Council of State Governments took the lead. To
support and advise came the Governors' Conference, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, the National Association of County and Prosecut-
ing Attorneys and the American Bar Association. It
was generally predicted, however-and correctly-that
this new idea must go through a few years of trial and
error and be amended several times before it was per-
fected.'91
'Jerome Beatty, A New Trap for Runaway Husbands, SATURDAY EVENING
POST, April 19, 1952, page 19 at 21, col. 1.
nIbid.
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In fact, that amending process has been under way, prac-
tically from the first. New York hurriedly passed some tem-
porary stop-gap legislation in 1948, to get the 'reciprocity' prin-
ciple under way." In 1949, this was supplanted by the more
fully drawn Code, known as "The Uniform Support of De-
pendents Law,' ' and actively promoted by the Council of State
Governments. In 1950, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Act adopted
by Montana in 1951. New York immediately amended her Uni-
form Dependents Law, to include some of the provisions of the
Commissioners' Act, and in 1952, the Commissioners approved
and submitted to the States for adoption an extensively amended
Enforcement of Support Act.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had dealt with
the problem of non-support many years ago, in the "Desertion
and Non-Support Act," approved in 1910, and formally adopted
by twenty-four states. However, it did not even attempt to go
beyond provisions for imposing criminal sanctions, and that lim-
ited by the traditional rule that the "crime" of desertion takes
place at the residence of the wife and children with prosecution
possible only there. The Conference of the Commissioners again
became interested in the operation of that Act, in 1942, appoint-
ing a study committee, and receiving a brief report therefrom
in that year. Though deciding that "duties of support" prob-
ably could not be dealt with effectively in a uniform act, the
committee continued to tinker with the subject, strictly within
the basic limits of the original Act, until in their 1949 report,
they dealt realistically for the first time with the migratory hus-
band and father, and the problem of actually getting support
from him, by approving the "reciprocal" approach, which
authorizes a procedure for subjecting him to the duty without
disturbing his earning capacity. This basic change in approach
apparently stemmed directly from New York's support of De-
pendents Law, through the Council of State Governments.
The Enforcement of Support Act attempts to do two quite
distinct things: 1. Eliminate all of the extreme obstacles existing
in the common law to the effective enforcement of civil duties of
support, created either under the local law or an applicable for-
"Note: New York Uniform Support of Depen4ents Law, 1 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 300, (301).
"Op. cit. supra, note 2.
"HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINOS, NAT'L. CON. COM., UN. ST. LAWS, pp. 58,
62, item 22, and 233 (1942). It may be of Interest to some that this re-
vived study was sparked by an article in Cosmopolitan magazine, by
Committee statement.
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eign law; 2. Provide an inexpensive, direct procedure for initiat-
ing a suit to enforce these civil remedies in the state where the
dependents reside, even though the defendant may be residing in
a distant state, and not amendable to local process at all. We
shall consider these two objectives separately.
IS THE ACT CIVIL OR CRIMINAL?
But first let us consider whether this Act provides essential-
ly a criminal or a civil remedy. The entire Act should be treated
as providing a civil remedy. But since so many of the profession
have considered it to be essentially criminal in character, we
must understand the reasons therefor, to justify the contrary con-
clusion. Both bench and bar generally have assumed that the
Act primarily is criminal in its operation, presumably for several
reasons, among which may be: (1) the inclusion of the extradi-
tion section; (2) the fact that enforcement is vested in the county
attorney; (3) the fact that in an interstate case, traditionally the
duty of support has been enforced primarily by means of the
criminal sanction ;17 (4) the Code editors have so classified it.
It is of primary importance to determine a correct answer to
this question, because it has many practical consequences. In the
first place, its constitutionality may be much more seriously
doubted if it is a criminal Act. But aside from that, the answer
to various other legal questions turns on this primary answer.
For example, at least one enforcing officer justifies the use of
the citation as originating process on the ground that the statute
is "quasi-criminal. "" The same attorney refuses to enforce re-
quests for a judgment for past due alimony on the ground that
this would be a civil judgment, and civil and criminal relief can-
not be combined in a single proceeding.
It is understandable that the profession should be condi-
tioned to interpreting this Act as essential criminal. Practically
the only method for enforcing duties of support in Montana in
the past has been by criminal sanctions. Superficially considered,
1 Though perhaps it is true, as one representative practitioner insists,
that, for local enforcement of support duties, many lawyers will think
first of and rely on the equitable action for maintenance in Montana,
it Is at least possible that the county attorneys and the courts, the ones
primarily entrusted with enforcing the Reciprocal Act, think primarily
id terms of criminal enforcement even for local litigants.
"There is a suspicion that enforcement officers think of the juvenile de-
linquent statutes as "essentially criminal," which is not correct. They
are essentially equitable in their procedure, even though criminal penal-
ties may be stipulated to aid in their enforcement-but so does the cita-
tion for contempt for disobeying a court decree, serve the same purpose
in any case.
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our applicable Criminal Code Sections seem to provide a very
similar treatment to that found in the Reciprocal Act. It author-
izes the judge to suspend the sentence, provided the defendant
agrees to pay support money, continuing suspended so long as
he pays.' The resemblance between this procedure and that dealt
with in Sections 5, and 6 of the Reciprocal Act, subjecting the
defendant to extradition proceedings, but granting him an ex-
emption therefrom if he agrees to comply with the decree impos-
ing the duty to support, is only superficial, however. Under
R.C.M. 1947, 94-302, no attempt is made to enforce a formally
established and judicially decreed duty of support. Though, we
maintain elsewhere, our Codes clearly affirm such duty, the
principle if not sole means of enforcing that duty has been
thought to be to use a criminal conviction in the local court as a
leverage for exacting the promise. So the promise to pay, ex-
acted from the defendant under 94-302, (a pure criminal statute)
is entirely dependent upon, incidental and subordinate to the
criminal conviction. Not so under the Reciprocal Act. As
Vernier says:
"The rule (duty of support) should not depend for
its efficacy upon the ability of the child to persuade mer-
chants to provide him with necessities, but direct action
on behalf of the child should be permitted in order to
secure funds with which the necessaries may be pur-
chased, or to force their purchase ... Therefore, a civil
statute meeting the needs above outlined might advan-
tageously be adopted. Perhaps such action is contem-
plated by the broad statutes herein discussed which do
not provide the means of enforcing the duty stated. If
so, they are faulty in not so specifying.'
That is exactly what the Reciprocal Act does.
Indeed, ordinarily, a civil liability to support is established
under the Act without any related extradition proceeding at all.
In very few cases will the requesting state really want the de-
fendant returned. The practical purpose of extradition Section
5 is to put more "bite" in any civil decree rendered under the
Act. The whole object of the Act is to let the obligor stay where
he has a job so he can continue working, without the stigma of
"criminality" attached to him.
Although with one exception noted shortly, the Enforce-
ment Act does not create any new duties not existing heretofore,
it does provide for a plain simple civil action to enforce what-
"
'This dispensation also Is possible under the Juvenile Codes.
1o0 VERNiEv, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 60 (1936).
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ever duties exist independently by the applicable law.' This
alone, is a monumental advance for many states. Moreover, it
provides this remedy, not only for the abandoned wife or child,
but for every other person entitled to support by the applicable
law.' It even creates an entirely new right of subrogation (for
an interstate suit) in a state expending welfare funds on an 'ob-
ligee,' entitled to support under the Act.' Such state can sue
the 'obligor,' the one with the duty of support, for the full
amount so expended. It is claimed that this is one of the most
important features of the entire Act." Certainly it will very
measurably discourage attempts to shift the burden of support to
the state.
One of the most serious obstacles to the enforcing of support
is that many states approve the rule that such duties are strictly
"local" in character. This is doubly restrictive in effect. As a
forum, such state applies its own law only for the benefit of its
own domiciliaries; it also refuses to enforce the support laws of
another state. The Reciprocal Act removes both of these restric-
tions to suit by providing first in Section 4, that the enacting
state will enforce duties of support, even though the obligee never
has resided or been present there, making its own duties of sup-
port available to foreign obligees.' Section 7, authorizes the en-
acting state's court to enforce duties of support created by a
foreign law in certain circumstances. These are monumental
'R.C.M. 1947, Section 94-901-9, states that, "All duties of support are en-
forceable by petition or complaint . . ." R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-3001
states that "Civil actions in the courts of record of this state are com-
menced by filing a complaint." R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-2211 says that,
"A civil action is prosecuted by one party against another for the en-
forcement or protection of a right, or the redress ... of a wrong." Under
the Reciprocal Act the moving party filing the complaint is the obligee,
in whose favor a duty of support is created, and he simply is trying. to
enforce that duty for his private benefit.
'Though much of our discussion concerns the rights of wives and chil-
dren, in judging the basic character of this proceeding, it is very im-
portant to realize the very broad range of persons who may sue as
obligees-wives, infant children, welfare agencies, parents, adult chil-
dren, grandparents, sisters, brothers, and any other in whose favor the
applicable law has created a right to claim support.
2R.C.M. 1947, Section 94-901-8. Though other recent social welfare legis-
lation has provided similar redress in particular instances, for an intra-
state proceeding, the remedy here created, for the benefit of a foreign
state, is much more nearly absolute than that generally recognized here-
tofore against its own "citizens" in a local suit.2
'9A UNIFORm LAWs ANNOTATED, 1953 CuM. AN. PocxKrr PT., Commi8-
sioners' Prefatory Note, p. 54.
2Unfortunately, this section is so worded as to appear to deal also with
the choice of law problem, apparently conflicting with Section 7, the
controlling section on choice of law. This problem Is discussed infra, at
notes 76-81.
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changes in traditional law, in clearing away hurdles to more ef-
fective enforcement.
As stated supra, the common law governing domestic rela-
tions generally, imposes a duty to support a wife and at least
legitimate children, quite independently of the criminal law."
Certainly, the duty does not originate with the criminal law, how-
ever much that may have been the primary sanction used for its
enforcement, in the past. Moreover, the Montana Civil Code on
Parent and Child, Husband and Wife, and Divorce, repeatedly
reaffirm that duty, though its provisions for effective civil en-
forcement have been very inadequate.' Hence the Reciprocal
Enforcement Act should be classified in the Montana Code as
involving almost exclusively civil rights and remedies. It was a
very serious error to classify it under Title 94, covering criminal
law and procedure. So the statement made in the Commissioners'
Prefatory Note that, "The 1950 act, . .. attempts to improve
and extend the enforcement of duties of support through both
the criminal and the civil law,' " is very misleading, at the least.
Sections 7, through 20, of the original Act,' deal exclusively
with the second primary objective of the Act, i.e., providing an
inexpensive procedure, originating in the obligee's home court,
for suing an out of state obligor. A local obligor must be pro-
ceeded against under other local rules. This is the "two-state"
suit contemplated by the Act, where the plaintiff's part of the
trial is carried on in his own court and the defendant's in his
own, the responding court. This is the least obvious portion of
the Act. It works like this. All duties of support are enforced
by a civil action initiated by a verified petition, or complaint,
stating the name, address and circumstances of the defendant,
"At nn. 3 and 4 supra,.
'Parent and child: R.C.M. 1947, Sections 61-104 through 61-107, and
Section 61-113; HU8band and Wife, R.C.M. 1947, Sections 36-103, 36-119,
and 36-121, imposing a contingent duty on wife to support husband;
Divorce: R.C.M. 1947, Sections 21-137 (includes action for support for
wife and children, without divorce, upon desertion by husband), 21-139.
In expanding the scope of duty of support reciprocally between adult
children and parents, where either Is indigent, which duty did not exist
at common law, our Code rather exceptionally expressly creates a plain
civil action to enforce such rights. See: R.C.M. 1947, Sections 61-114,
61-124, and 61-126.
2Op. cit. 8upra, note 24 at page 53. Practically all interest and discus-
sion has been centered on the strictly "civil" action provided for by the
Act, with the concomitant problem of providing an adequate procedure
for the divided trial, having to do exclusively with the civil remedy
given.
'The Uniform Draft Act was formally divided into three parts: PART I-
General Provisions, Sections 5 and 6, with 6 relieving defendant from
the extradition authorized by 5; PART III-Civil Enforcement, Sections
7-20. Unfortunately the divisions were omitted in the Montana Act.
9
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with "all other pertinent information."' (This has been de-
scribed as a 'simplified' complaint.)' If this complaint states
a cause of action, or makes out a case of 'probable cause,' as to
the defendant's liability (raises a presumptive liability in the
defendant), the initiating court certifies that fact to the respond-
ing court (where it appears the defendant may be subjected to
personal jurisdiction), along with certified copies of the com-
plaint." The responding court files the complaint for the plain-
tiff (thus "docketing the cause"), notifies the enforcing officer
(the county attorney in Montana), sets a time and place for
hearing, and secures personal jurisdiction over the defendant.'
The Act then says simply, "If the court of the responding state
finds a duty of support, it may order the defendant . . . to fur-
nish support or reimbursement therefor and subject the property
of the defendant to such order.""'
This simple proceeding intends to remove two very serious
practical difficulties facing the obligee in the past. The first one
is that raised by distance in initiating a suit in the obligor's state.
The second one is that of cost, by providing that certain state
agencies shall carry forward the litigation, at a minimum of cost
to the dependents,, Associated with this fact is the closely re-
lated one that various persons are made available to the obligees
for the purpose of counseling, advising, aiding, and even pushing
the obligees into starting proceedings. This has been a primary
obstacle in the past in even getting an action started.'
Unquestionably, however, the summary statement of the pro-
ceeding outlined above, which substantially is all that the Act
says about how the suit is to be prosecuted, leaves a great deal
"R.C.M. 1947, Section 94-901-9. The draft act says, "by action (petition)
(proceeding) (complaint) ... "
'Brockelbank, The Problem of Family Support: A New Uniform Act Of-fer8 a Solution, 37 A. B. A. JRNL 93, 96, col. 3 (1951). Professor
Brockelbank was chairman of the Commissioners' drafting committee
when the 1950 draft was approved.
'Under the 1950 Act, the papers transmitted also must include an authen-
ticated copy of its Reciprocal Law, to establish that it is entitled to
reciprocal treatment under the responding state's act. But under the
1950 Act as amended, authentication is not necessary.
"Actually, the Act also authorizes the responding court to exercise a
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction where it cannot serve him personally but can
seize his property, rendering a decree enforcible to the value of the
property. This is the most reasonable construction of Sections 94-901-11,
94-901-12, 94-901-13.
"R.C.M. 1947, Section 94-901-13.
"Section 11 of the 1952 Amended Act, an entirely new section, not only
requires the enforcement officer to represent the plaintiff in the initiat-
ing state, but also attempts to name all agencies and offices that might
have an interest in the plaintiff, directing them to counsel her and to
cause the initiation of an action, if deemed desirable.
10
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unsaid. Apparently, the Act's framers optimistically expected
all courts and enforcing officials to be very imaginative in adapt-
ing the Act to existing rules of procedure. But at the outset, it is
very important that we anchor ourselves with two fundamental
propositions, implicit in the Act. The first one is that the only
court with jurisdiction to render any kind of binding decree or
judgment in this action is the responding court-provided it se-
cures jurisdiction over the defendant, or his property.' The
initiating court is calling on the responding court precisely for
the reason that it has not and cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant, and so can render no kind of judgment binding him
personally.' The initiating court cannot do more than certify
that the plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action on its face,
or establishes a prima facie case for finding a duty of support
against the defendant.' It cannot make any kind of order or
decree finding the duty. The sole reason for such certification
is to protect the responding court against frivolous charges and
wholly unjustified requests to cooperating states to take their
time and sustain the costs of a trial. These initial steps are sim-
ply to get the obligee's complaint filed in the responding state
at a minimum of cost to her. Once it is filed, we are led inexor-
ably to the conclusion that it is exactly as though she had hired
an attorney in the responding state to initiate an ordinary civil
action there on her behalf. Those studying the Act thoroughly,
tacitly or expressly grant this much.' Once the complaint is
filed in the responding state, how do we proceed?
"In view of this fact, the clause in the title to the Montana Act, referring
to 'judgments,' is unfortunate: ". . . providing duties in district court
to respond to judgments in support actions brought in states with re-
ciprocal laws." It is doubtful that this word Intends to refer to any-
thing else than the "record" transmitted from the initiating court to the
responding court. This must not be thought of as in any sense a "judg-
ment."
"Of course, the plaintiff may already have a judgment based on personal
jurisdiction conclusively establishing defendant's duty, on which she
bases her present reciprocal action-but that is another matter.
8A very satisfactory wording of the "finding" in the certification is used
in a California certification form: ". . . and that in the opinion of the
undersigned Judge of the above-entitled Court, the defendant should be
compelled to answer such complaint and to be dealt with according to
law."
On request, The Council of State Governments, 1313 East 60th St., Chi-
cago 37, Ill., will supply a pamphlet entitled, Reciprocal State Legisla-
tion to Enforce the Support of Dependents (1953), containing, in addi-
tion to other pertinent data on procedural requirements for each state
having the Act, proposed model procedural forms for the Initiating
state, including forms for testimony by petitioner, sample form of the
petition, and one for certification.
"Brockelbank, Multiple-State Enforcement of Family Support, 2 ST.
Louis UxivERsiTY LAw JouRNAL 12 (1952).
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The second fundamental proposition mentioned above, an-
swers that question. The Act makes no attempt to set up special
procedures, other than including an optional section,' rejected by
Montana, that would extend any informal rules of evidence that
might be practiced in certain other proceedings, as in juvenile
delinquency. The Commissioners' note puts it thus: "Provisions
covering other details of procedure have been kept out of the Act
so that the usual rules for obtaining jurisdiction, for carrying
on the procedure and for appeal may be held to govern."' 1 Sub-
ject to a slight qualification discussed infra," this would seem
clearly to require that we treat this suit as being subject to all
of those rules generally governing an ordinary, simple, civil ac-
tion.
This being so, the complaint itself is subject to our Code re-
quirements as to formal content, and is demurrable for substan-
tially the same reasons as is any other complaint stating a cause
of action essentially equitable in character. It is to be hoped that
our courts will not impose outrageously strict requirements as to
pleading. To do so would make the cooperation between courts
contemplated by the Reciprocal Act much more difficult. Sub-
ject to this proviso, however, if a complaint certified from an-
other court is clearly insufficient under our Code, which is one
criticism lodged against the efficacy of the Act, and so is ob-
viously demurrable, the responding court will greatly expedite
the proceeding if it will return the complaint to the initiating
court with a notation as to the obvious defect." Though a literal
application of Section 12 of the Act might suggest that the. re-
sponding court has a ministerial duty to "docket the cause," in
every case, upon receipt of the certified papers, it is submitted
that this Section must be construed in the light of the overriding
policy to treat the certification by the initiating court simply as
a device to originate the civil action in the responding court.
19A UNIFORM LAws ANNO., CuM. AN. PocKET Pt., (1953) Uniform Recip.
Enforcement of Support Act, Section 19, proposes to provide special
rules of evidence; Ibid, 1952 Act, as Amended, in Section 19, proposes to
apply varying proceedings according to the "type of duty of support
claimed". Neither of these sections is law in Montana.
"Op. cit. supra, note 40, (ommi88ioner8' Prefatory Note, page 55.
'*The action is conceived as being essentially equitable in character. Cita-
tion or order to show cause, may. be appropriate as supplementary pro-
cess, as discussed infra.
"Actually, there appears to be considerable improvement in the suf-
ficiency of the complaints being filed. Many of the more recent ones
show a real effort to have them properly framed. Furthermore, the
recommended practice under the proposed uniform forms mentioned
supra, note 38, calls for a transcript of testimony, sworn to and taken
by the initiating judge, and transmitted with the complaint.
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Holding a tight rein on the proceeding, the latter court deter-
mines the sufficiency of the pleadings at every stage. Stated
another way, the responding court is acting under its own
Reciprocal Act, not that of the initiating state. Hence, it is for
it, and it alone, to determine how and when the initiating court
has qualified to ask for the former's assistance. By the Commis-
sioners' own construction, this must be measured by the respond-
ing court's general rules governing pleadings. If this should
prove unsatisfactory, further statutory modifications will be
necessary.
Is "SHOW CAUSE" ORDER SUFFICIENT SERVICE?
The same rules must govern all questions of process. In so
far as is possible under the wording of the Act, it would seem
that that process generally used in an ordinary civil action must
follow. Originating process thus would be the summons. In-
deed, it may very well be that any decree or judgment renderd
without the issuing and service of a summons, or without the
attaching of property, would be found void on appeal, under
R.C.M. 1947, Sections 93-3001, 93-3002 and 93-3003. These sec-
tions provide for the issuing of a summons for every ordinary
civil action, as a matter of course, and no exception whatever is
indicated. Yet, the common practice under the Act, so far, seems
to be to issue an order to show cause as originating process.
If such practice can be justified in the light of the character
of the action, admittedly it has some advantages, at least in ex-
pediting the action on behalf of the plaintiff. But it should not
be used as originating process, for the following reasons: 1. T)here
is at least some reason to suspect that its use comes from uncer-
tainty and confusion as to the essential nature of the proceeding
called for by the Reciprocal Act." If this be true, use of the
order will tend further to create, perpetuate and emphasize that
confusion. However, at least one enforcing officer, having con-
siderable experience with the Act, approves use of a "citation"
requiring a showing of cause, only because he has determinedly
treated it as a "quasi-criminal" proceeding, and agrees that, as
an ordinary civil action, the order cannot be justified-thus per-
petuating a misinterpretation of the Act. 2. There is danger
that such decree would be reversed by the Supreme Court because
not supported by a legal service for a civil action. We have said
"Such confusion may result either from a feeling that the Reciprocal Act
intends to provide simply for a continuation in the responding state of
a suit already under way in the initiating state, or in a misinterpreta-
tion of the essential character of the proceeding authorized by the Act.
13
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that the plaintiff's action is an ordinary civil action, as defined
under R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-2203, seeking to establish an ob-
ligation imposed by operation of law, as defined under R.C.M.
1947, Section 93-2207, and to impose and enforce that obligation
against the defendant, in the exclusive manner provided for ordi-
nary proceedings under R.C.M. 1947, Sections 93-3001 ff. If
these conclusions are correct, current practice poses this ques-
tion: "Is the order to show cause as originating process, either
appropriate or permissible for this ordinary civil action under
the Code ?
The characteristic use of the rule or order is as a substitute
for the notice ordinarily required in response to motions made
in the course of and incidental to a proceeding in which the court
already has acquired jurisdiction over both parties and the sub-
ject matter. A very recent California case puts it simply thus:
"It is well settled that an order to show cause is a notice of mo-
tion. "'5 Again it is said that,
"An order to show cause is a notice of motion and a
citation to the party to appear at a stated time and place
to show cause why a motion should not be granted. The
primary function of such an order is to bring a motion
before the court more speedily than it could be done by
ordinary motion; and when so used it is a substitute for
the notice of motion required by law. '""
An interesting feature of such orders is that they are framed
as if they are in response to a motion that the responding court
issue summary judgment against the defendant. They require
him "to show cause why he should not be made to support the
plaintiff," or" to pay as the plaintiff demands," etc. Such rule
cannot be in response to any properly framed certification by the
initiating court, which can only ask the responding court to pro-
ceed with trial. Certainly, the plaintiff's complaint should not
be treated as a 'motion' any more than in any other civil action.
Divorce and injunctive actions, in which the order is regularly
used, collateral to the primary proceeding, furnish no precedent
for its use as originating process.
Of course, use of the order to show cause as originating pro-
cess may be expressly authorized by statute. This is true in spe-
cial proceedings where there is particular justification for making
the proceeding summary in character. But, it is frequently as-
serted that, "The right to summary process implies pendency of
"Silva v. Mercier, 187 P 2d 60, 62 (1947), aff. 33 C 2d 704, 204 P 2d 609.
'Black v. Coughlin (1894) 105 Cal. 268, 38 P. 730; 7 BANCROFT'S CODE
PRACTICE AND Rmmms 7664 (1928).
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suit between parties and is confined to incidental matters arising
during the contestation, except where summary proceeding is ex-
pressly allowed by law."'7 And, "The right to initiate original
proceeding by rule to show cause is derived from express statu-
tory authority.' " It also is put thus.: "The right to initiate an
original proceeding by rule to show cause must . . .be derived
from express statutory authority, and, in the absence of statutory
or exceptional circumstances, a rule or order to show cause will
not be available as original process, but only as process auxiliary
to jurisdiction already obtained.''
Certainly, the action here considered is not a "special pro-
ceeding" in any sense, and there is not any statutory authority
authorizing the use of the order as originating process in this leg-
islation or elsewhere. The court cannot rely on R.C.M. 1947 Sec-
tion 93-1106, giving it authority to adopt any suitable procedure
"conformable to the spirit of the Code," "if the course of the
proceeding be not specifically pointed out," when it is given a
particular jurisdiction, because this, being a civil action, the mini-
mum essential procedure is "specifically pointed out."
It is submitted that the fact that the Reciprocal Act stipu-
lates that the court shall "set a time and place for the hearing,'
should not be taken as so authorizing the order. True, that pro-
vision does not seem to fit readily with the requirement of a
summons providing that the defendant shall have twenty days in
which to answer. This language can conceivably be construed as
giving the judge a broad discretion as to how he should proceed.
But, abridging the defendant's rights generally present in a civil
action as to time allowed for his answer-a substantial right-
should not be lightly considered. If he has a real defense, he
should be given time to prepare-remember the issues raised on
the show cause order as generally framed, are not incidental or
collateral to the primary merits of the case; they are the case
itself. There is nothing more in this record justifying ordering
the defendant to show cause as to why the court should not re-
quire that he comply with the plaintiff's demands set forth in the
complaint than in any other complaint in an ordinary civil action,
when it is first filed.
Even if a show cause order is issued, it should only supple-
ment service of a summons, and in such event, might be framed
to require the defendant to show cause why the court should not
"Foret v. Stark (1943) 16 So. 2d 79, 82.
"Ibid.
"60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders, Section 20 at na. 5, 6, and 7.WR.C.M_ 1947, 94-901-12.
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honor the request of the initiating state that he be subjected to
suit. The hearing on such order may be timed with the service
of the summons. If it be insisted that there is reason for expedit-
ing this proceeding to give the plaintiff badly needed relief, and
that the Act's provision directing the judge to "set a time and
place for the hearing" so authorizes, it does not necessarily fol-
low that the show cause order must be used as originiating process.
Admittedly the state recognizes a very direct and substantial in-
terest in itself in such suit, evidenced by the fact that it assumes
the bulk of the costs for the litigation, and expects to be relieved
of great welfare costs; in addition, its direct interest in the de-
pendant's welfare generally, as parens patriae, is expressed in a
great variety of ways.' Hence, if there is reason to bring in the
defendant on short notice, to get the proceedings under way, he
might very well be subpoenad as in a proceeding in which the
state is concerned, under R.C.M. 1947, Section 25-218, providing
for the calling of witnesses on behalf of the state. Nothing in the
Section limits it to cases where the state is a formal party.'
Perhaps it would be more appropriate yet, however, to rely
on the court's equitable powers under R.C.M. 1947, Section
10-616, regulating the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and em-
powering it to issue any process necessary to compel the attend-
ance of a child's parents or any other necessary person. The es-
sential purpose of this suit is exactly the same as under 10-616,
to compel the parent to provide, at least where the dependent is
a child, and probably is similar enough to warrant the same kind
of process in any support case. The issuing either of a subpoena
or a citation, as is provided for in 10-616 has the very real ad-
vantage that the defendant will be subject to the compulsion of
the court to respond. It is most necessary that we actually get
the defendant into court.
An informal hearing before trial could save considerable
time, being just a form of pre-trial hearing, and which would be
a most desirable practice in these cases. Sometimes such hearing
will establish the undesirability of proceeding with the action.
In any case, the provision directing the court to "set a time and
place for a hearing," would be complied with, consistently with
"Though traditionally, it has been insisted that one state cannot be in-
terested in the securing of support for citizens of other states, the Re-
ciprocal Act is framed on an enlarged view of each state's interest-each
state i8 interested in the other's obligees, so that it may more effectively
secure support for its own obligees.
"At least there are not nearly the serious objections to extending this
section by implication, that there are to extending the uses of the order
to show cause by implication.
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the essential nature of the proceeding as an ordinary civil action.
Experience so far has shown that, as to the very large bulk
of litigation under the Act, the defendant will admit liability
readily, so that there may be very good reason for bringing him
before the Court at the earliest practicable moment by supple-
mentary process, so as to give the petitioner relief at the earliest
possible moment. However, for those defendants who resist the
allegations of the complaint, not only should they be given the
full time to respond contemplated by the summons issued in con-
nection with a civil action generally, but they must likewise be
granted all the other safeguards normally available to such de-
fendant. Hence, assuming that he insists on litigating, but that
the complaint will withstand a demurrer, the defendant will next
answer, which, if subject to a reply, should be certified by the
responding court and remitted to the initiating court, reversing
the procedure set forth in Section 11 for the original certifica-
tion. The reply, in turn will be dealt with in the same manner.
Certainly the pleading requirements of the responding state are
the ones that must control here.'
It likewise is generally recognized, at least now, that the re-
sponding court should not render a judgment merely on the
pleadings." Not only is the defendant entitled to insist that the
plaintiff must "prove," as well as allege, but that those rules
of evidence and of proof generally utilized to give the greatest
possible assurance for arriving at the "truth" are preserved to
him. So, the complaint is not evidence, because a self-serving
declaration.' So, also, the right to give evidence by testimony
and to cross-examine the opponent's witnesses are to be preserved.
Certainly, in no kind of case, are the issues more likely to be more
hotly contested, and more colored with emotion and with the
temptation to falsify than in a support case where the defendant
denies paternity, or where there is a substantial issue of "fault"
involved. Nowhere will cross examination be more vital to ascer-
taining the truth. Fortunately, such cases will be comparatively
rare. When they arise, however, full resort to the use of in-
terrogatories, discovery, and depositions will be in order.
The new York Act expressly provides for the procedure out-
lined above, detailing the mailing back and forth of the record,
"Such rule is axiomatic in the conflicts field. Though the principle that
"the law of the forum governs procedural matters" is being critically
re-examined today, there seems no reason to question it regarding the
present issue.
TBrockelbank, op. cit. aupra 39, at 20-21; 1 A.L.R. 42 (1919).
5Ibid.
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both to complete the pleadings and to take proof," empowering
the initiating court to make a specific recommendation to the re-
sponding court, after the former has taken evidence from the
petitioner in response to the defendant's denials. It concludes
with, "Upon the resumption of such hearing, the respondent
shall have the right to examine or cross-examine the petitioner
and the petitioner's witnesses by means of depositions or written
interogatories, and the petitioner shall have the . . . (same
right)."' Though the Commissioners' Uniform Act does not so
state, this same procedure inevitably follows their clear intent
that, ". . . the usual rules (of the enacting state) for obtaining
jurisdiction, for carrying on the procedure and for appeal may
be held to govern.' Our Code contains no statute providing-
for any other kind of procedure.
The above discussion assumes that each party is in his own
respective separate court. Though the Act contemplates this, it
does not require it. There is nothing to prevent either party
from appearing in the other court at any. given stage either gen-
erally, or for a very limited purpose. Indeed, when the defend-
ant is denying paternity, it may well be that he should hire coun-
sel to represent him in the plaintiff's court. Of course, in many
areas, the two courts will be very close together. This is strik-
ingly demonstrated in a recent New York-Connecticut proceeding.
The New York court transmitted a certified petition to the Con-
necticut court, requesting that the respondent be made to support
his wife, petitioner, and child. The respondent denied paternity
at the Connecticut hearing, and the latter court remanded the
proceedings to the New York Court to determine the issue of
paternity. The present decision is one by the New York Court, '
on this issue, with both parties appearing with counsel. It is
significant to note that the initiating court treated the respond-
ent's appearance as being only for the purpose of testifying and
cross-examining. It did not attempt to exercise a personal juris-
diction over him as defendant, granting him the privilege of "ap-
pearing specially" for this purpose. Further, reciting that the
issue of paternity was remanded to the initiating state for final
determination, apparently, the New York court considers itself
as acting in an advisory capacity, only, concluding that it still is
necessary to remit "an exemplified transcript of the proof and
evidence and of the proceedings and recommendation taken in
5'Op. Cit. supra 2, Section 2116, particularly paragraphs (e) through (i).
'Op. Cit. supra, 2, Section 2116 (1).
'Op. Cit. supra, 41.
PIn re Miller, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 304 (1952).
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this court, ... (to) ... the Court in Connecticut, where the final
order will be made and enforcement may be had." This seems
to be an eminently correct decision.
On the other hand, a recent Arkansas case warns of the need
for caution in appearing before the initiating court.' There, the
Arkansas Court took personal jurisdiction of defendant to render
a single adjudication, where he appeared in his wife's original
action, filing a written motion and a petition for continuance
there, though he lived in Pennsylvania, and though, without such
appearance, the proceeding would have had to continue in Penn-
sylvania.
The New York case discussed just above, suggests something
of the possible flexibility in procedure desirable under the Act.
Actually, the extremely inclusive provisions of the Act, in giving
any and all kinds of dependants, based on any and every duty
of support, whether the duty originates from statute or from
court decree topped off with a right of subrogation in state wel-
fare agencies, may justify varying treatment in detail, as the
issues and the manner of proof vary according to the type of case
involved." We have assumed a case so far, where the initiating
court has not now and never has had personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. But the Act seems surely to include a case where
the plaintiff already has a divorce from her home court, with a
provision for alimony, supported by personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, at the time, with the defendant having failed to
pay and is now in a foreign state. W wants to recover for past
due alimony and also enforce her duty of support under the de-
cree in the future. She can institute an original suit in her home
court, tendering that court's own decree to prove her claim, and
that court can then ask the responding court to proceed with the
suit by obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant. Based on the
record, the initiating court, contrary to the more typical case, can
here make an absolute finding of a continuing duty to support, in
its certification to the responding court.' Therefore, there may
OThe New York Act expressly gives the initiating court a power to "rec-
ommend" to the responding court, upon further hearing there, but it is
clear under that Act that the responding court is the proper one to enter
the judgment it deems proper. Op. cit. 8upra, 2, Sections 2116 (g) (h) (i).
'Dean v. Dodge (1952) 220 Ark. 853, 250 S.W. 2d 731.
6The 1952 Amendatory Act expressly so provides in Section 19, as an
optional section.
"A cautionary word is needed even here. Even notice requirements re-
cently have been made stricter to satisfy due process. In Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652,
and more particularly in Griffin v. Griffin (1946) 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct.
556, 90 L. Ed. 635, the Court makes it clear that the doctrine of
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 61 L.Ed. 608 (1917) (Re-
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be a little more basis for contending that the latter court can hale
the defendant before it by an order to show cause why he should
not be made to pay, treating the proceeding simply as supple-
mentary process in aid of the initiating court's attempt to get
summary execution on its original decree. It is believed, how-
ever, that this argument completely loses sight of the basic nature
of the proceeding under the Reciprocal Act. This law does not
provide a summary method for certifying, filing or recording a
foreign judgment for the purpose of entitling it to all local pro-
cess for summary execution in any event. W has brought an
original action under the Reciprocal Act, as in any other case,
and she must still prove her claim in the responding state as in
any other cause-though the matter of proof is now tremendous-
ly simplified for her. And the responding court still must try
her claim in the same way as it would were she to sue on her be-
half locally, on the foreign cause of action. As to the accrued
alimony, she is suing essentially in debt, and as to both the past
due alimony and the future duty to pay, the defendant may have
very real and substantial defenses. He may have paid; or he
may challenge the validity of the original decree, insisting that
it is void. He still must be given his day in court subject to the
same procedural rules as in any other ordinary civil action.
COMMON CRITICISMS AND THE 1952 REvIsiD ACT
The Uniform Commissioners enacted an extensively amended
Uniform Reciprocal Duty of Support Act in 1952," almost
amounting to a revision of the 1950 Act, adopted by Montana.
That many of the criticisms of the 1950 Act, made by judges and
attorneys in the state, have merit and express the very common
reaction of the profession over the country generally is attested
to by the fact that the 1952 amendments deal with many of these
same objections, seeking to remedy them. The Amended Act
also attests to the fact that its framers believe these objections are
quiring that kind of available substituted service which is most likely
to give defendant actual notice, even where substituted service is al-
lowed) is to be extended to at least some kinds of mere notice, where
the court already has acquired personal jurisdiction. In Griffin v. Grif-
fin, the Court ruled that a New York judgment which had been rendered
ex parte for past due alimony, without any notice to the defendant, was
not entitled to full faith and credit in the District of Columbia. The
responding court should take this into account in considering any for-
eign judgment sued upon. Though such summary judgment should not
be enforceable, however, the original judgment for alimony will support
an ordinary action under the Reciprocal Act, because the defendant must
be properly served in that action, and the original decree is valid.
"Op. cit. supra, 23, at page 82.
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not fundamental and can be entirely eliminated by additional ex-
perience.
One of the most common administrative difficulties, men-
tioned frequently by state enforcements officers is that the papers
the initiating state sends the responding state contains altogether
too little information for identifying and locating the defendant.
Sections 10 and 18 of the amended Act seek to correct this condi-
tion, enjoining both the plaintiff and the responding court to
much greater diligence and ingenuity to that end. The former
enumerates (for illustration only) the various kinds of real evi-
dence that may be appended to the complaint, such as a photo-
graph, finger prints, Social Security number, description of any
distinguishing marks of his person, other possible names and
aliases than his own, by which he might be known, etc. Section
18, requires the responding court to report immediately inability
to locate because of insufficiency of description, and to be aggres-
sive in using all means at its disposal, while holding the case
pending additional information from the initiating court. Of
course, these provisions will not eliminate the difficulty, which
is inherent in the character of the litigation involved, but per-
sistent practice and continued experience following these direc-
tions will substantially reduce the difficulty.
Related to the responding court's problem of locating the
defendant, is the initiating court's difficulty in identifying and
locating the responding court. Section 13 of the amended Act
imposes the duty on the initiating court by implication, to learn
the address of the information agency in each state which will
serve as intermediary between the initiating and the responding
courts. Practically every state with the Act has such agency. A
listing of them can be secured from the Council of State Govern-
ments.' It also is available in the Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part of the Uniform Laws, Volume 9a for 1953.' Section 16 of
the Act also stipulates the Information Agency for the enacting
state, requiring that Agency to compile a list of local competent
courts and send to the corresponding agency in other states, and
to receive the same from other states and transmit to the local
courts.
The original Act says nothing of how the matter of fees and
6'The Council of State Governments, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37,
Illinois.
wOp. cit. supra, 23, at 50-52.
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costs are to be disposed of.' Several attorneys mention this fact.
The attorney General's Office has ruled that the regular filing
fees should be charged.' Since the need for depositions and in-
terrogatories appears to be common under the Act, a common
objection is that these costs make total expenses under the Act
excessive, largely defeating a primary purpose thereof. Evident-
ly they have not been used under our Act largely for that rea-
son.' The new Act deals with the subject in Section 14, provid-
ing that any court acting under the Act may, in its discretion,
decide whether all costs and fees sould be assumed by the state.
It is recognized that the amount involved and the economic condi-
tion of the parties may sometimes justify leaving the costs with
them.
Section 15 makes a rather half hearted attempt to cope with
the common plaint that most defendants are transients, econom-
ically irresponsible, and that if they don't leave before trial, they
nearly always disappear after making one or two payments, by
providing that the initiating court may request and the respond-
ing court may proceed to arrest the defendant, to insure his
presence.
Some county attorneys have taken the position that they have
no duty as such, to represent the plaintiff in initiating an action
under the Act,-and probably correctly, as now written," even
though such interpretation may limit somewhat the effectiveness
of the Act. Though there is no doubt that this Act takes a major
step in "socializing" this particular field of the law, in which
the state assumes a primary responsibility in proceeding with the
litigation, the proper thing to do is to leave it to the legislature
to make clear just how far it wants to involve the state therein.
The amended Act gives a clear answer to that question, in Section
11, expressly requiring an appropriate enforcement officer to act
on behalf of any plaintiff, and also brings any and all welfare
agencies into the picture more clearly by designating them as
proper agents to cause such action to be taken-and to advise
O'At least some county attorneys' offices in the state are extending the
benefit of R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-8625 granting the right to sue in
forma pauperi8, not only to the plaintiff initiating a suit here, but to
foreign plaintiffs, as well. The language of the Section readily permits
that construction.
6"24 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONs, Number 105, rendered July 14, 1952.
'Several judges and letters from county attorneys say that depositions
and interrogatories have been little used, largely for this reason.
"
0Although R.C.M. 1947, Section 94-901-12 requires the responding court
to "inform the county attorney to proceed with the cause," Section
94-901-11 gives no such direction to the district court as initiating court.
No Section expressly imposes a duty on any public official to act as
counsel for the plaintiff in the initiating court.
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and give counsel to a prospective plaintiff. But until this Sec-
tion is adopted in Montana, any county attorney is within his
"rights" under the earlier Act to refrain from initiating such
action, though at least some county attorneys offices are perform.
ing this service currently in Montana.
The above criticisms involve administrative difficulties al-
most exclusively. One involving a more substantial question of
law is that the complaint filed with the responding court almost
invariably does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action
under local procedure. Though the 1952 Act provides for addi-
tional information in the complaint, in Section 10, it relates only
to the question of identifying and locating the defendant, as
pointed out supra. Actually, however, an examination of com-
plaints from other states does not bear out the statement that
they always fail to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action
under the local law. Indeed, there is strong evidence that courts
generally exercising jurisdiction under the Act are coming to
agree that such complaint must satisfy the requirements of the
responding court's law, as to sufficiency, and that the latter gen-
erally will require as full a recital as for any ordinary civil
action." In addition, to obviate the common requirement in an
action based on this kind of liability that any judgment must be
supported by some evidence-and that the bare complaint cannot
be introduced as such evidence, being a self-serving declaration,"
initiating courts frequently now subject the plaintiff to an ex-
amination under oath by the court itself, sending the resulting
transcript along with the complaint.8 In other words, whatever
defects may have existed in this area initially, seem to respond
readily to developing procedures based on a little experience
with the Act.
We have just considered some of those complaints against
the Act, which seem to process of partial correction, either by
legislative amendment, or by modifying practice. There remain
some questions largely unmentioned by the Montana profession,
apparently because their experience has not proceeded far enough
to lay those questions bare.
"Sample complaints and certifications from California and Washington
being currently used seem quite adequate. As the uniform forms re-
sulting from recommendations of interstate conferences on reciprocal
non-support legislation come into more general use, this difficulty will
very largely abate. These forms are available in a pamphlet distributed
by the Council of State Governments, supra n. 38.
"Op. cit. 8upra, n. 54.
"Sample form number One in the uniform forms proposed by the Council
of State Governments, supra, n. 38, at 12.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS ISSUES
Probably the least satisfactory part of the Reciprocal Act,
in terms of draftmanship are those sections determing the
"choice-of-law" issue under the Act, i.e., by what law the plain-
tiff is entitled to claim the benefit of a duty of support against
the defendant, making him an obligor. Section 7 states the choice
of law rule in the alternative-the plaintiff having the benefit
of either of two principal laws. However, Section 4 also deals
with the subject sufficiently to require considering the two to-
gether. The latter reads:
"Extent of duties of support. The duty of support
imposed by the laws of this state or by the laws of the
state where the obligee was present when the failure to
support commended as provided in section 7 (94-901-7)
and the remedies provided for enforcement thereof, in-
cluding any penalty imposed thereby, bind the obligor
regardless of the presence of residence of the obligee."
Section 7 reads:
"Civil enforcement-what duties are enforceable.
Duties of support enforceable under this law are those
imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where
the alleged obligor was present during the period for
which support is sought or where the obligee was present
when the failure to support commenced, at the election
of the obligee." '
In enacting Section 4, the apparent object was to repudiate
the traditional doctrine that locally created duties of support
exist only for the benefit of local resident plaintiffs. The Code
Commissioners put it thus:
"The only extension of the duties of support is the
principle stated in Section 4 that the duty shall bind the
obligor regardless of the presence or residence of the
obligee. The purpose here is to overcome the rule in
some states that the duty of support runs only in favor
of obligees within the state,.. . "'
Sec. 7 is generally understood as providing an alternative
choice of law rule. Though it selects either any law where the
defendant has been present, or where the "obligee was pres-
"R.C.M. 1947, Sections 94-901-4 and 94-9017.
"o'Op. cit. supra, n. 23.
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ent . . ." Section 4 seems to assume that the choice of laws
available by the appropriate "choice of law" rules are either
"those imposed by the laws of this (the enacting) state, or those
imposed by the "place where the plaintiff was present when the
duties of support commenced." It is submitted that this incon-
sistency in terminology is the result of faulty draftsmanship, and
should be corrected as soon as possible. The same Sections in the
1952 Act are amended to reduce the proper "choice of law" in
any case under the Act to "the laws of any state where the obligor
was present during the period for which support is sought"
under Section 7 completely eliminating the alternative which the
plaintiff has under the Montana Act. Section 4 further refers
to "the laws of this state" only "when applicable under Section
7," i.e., when the defendant has been "present" in this (the en-
acting) state for part or all of the period during which support
is sought. So, under the Amended Act, the two Sections are
completely harmonized. However, in Montana, these Sections
as originally drafted continue to be the law for the time being;
so we have to try to interpret them in their original form.
One might try to explain Section 4 on any one of at least
three different grounds: 1. As being a declaration by the enact-
ing state that all duties of support created under its own law
may be available to non-residents as well as its own residents, in
proper cases; 2. As being a declaration that, whenever its courts
(i.e., the enacting states') select a law under the controlling
choice of law rule provided by Section 7, that law is to be ap-
"
0The last alternative choice in this Section is criticized as being based on
"circular reasoning." The writer assumes that the phrase "when the
failure to support commenced" necessarily has an exclusively "legal"
meaning. See Otterstedt, Reciprocal Support Legislation, CURRENT
TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 1952 (Legislative Research Center, Uni-
versity of Michigan Law Cchool) 165 at 232 ff. The criticism must be
rejected, however. If the Section is related to and interpreted in the
light of the allegations of each particular complaint, any apparent cir-
cularity of reasoning should be resolved. If the plaintiff relies on an
absolute duty to support, i.e., a subsisting duty in the defendant, as
husband, or father, it is only necessary to determine where the plain-
tiff was "present", at the moment that the defendant ceased to support
in fact, to ascertain the applicable law. We then look to that law to
see whether the failure in fact violates a legal duty-whether a legal
duty is imposed by that law. On the other hand, if the plaintiff relies
on a contingent duty, being say a grandparent, claiming to be indigent,
two facts must be first alleged in the complaint: 1. The moment at
which the plaintiff became indigent, with the further fact that the de-
fendant provided no support at that time; 2. the further allegation
that the law where the plaintiff was at the moment of his indigence did
impose a legal duty to support, on the defendant. (Cf. this phrase with
ambiquity in phrase "place of contracting," or, "place of the tort," used
to make the 'choice of law' when the questtion is whether there is either
a contract or a tort.)
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plied free of the traditional restriction that such duties were
created only for that law's domiciliaries; 3. As constituting a
declaration of policy encompassing both" 1" and "2". However,
the differences in the applicable law expressed by the varying
language of 4 and 7 respectively, cannot be completely harmon-
ized under any one of these three. No. "1" interpretation would
have been accomplished simply by stating the rule with reference
to the "duties of support created by the laws of this state,"
without referring to any alternative law. Under "2", Section 4
should refer to the same possible choices of law as provided for
by Section 7; and under" 3", Section 4 should refer to the duties
created, a. by its own law; b. by the law of any state where
the defendant had been present; c. by the law of the place
where the plaintiff was present when the duty first commenced.
Hence, there remains a difficult problem of construction.
Probably the overall purpose of the Act will be best served
by giving Section 4 the number "2" interpretation, supra, with
the further limitation that the reference to the "law of this
state" in Section 4 is controlled and thus limited by Section 7,
so as to contain this further implied limitation, "when applicable
under Section 7." This is precisely the manner in which it is
limited in the new Section 4 of the 1952 Act."8
As drafted, these sections determining the choice of law
under the Act, raise still another (a very different kind of) prob-
lem. Under them, both the jurisdiction of the court to entertain
the suit, and the choice of the applicable law, are controlled sim-
ply by "presence" in contrast to the traditional relationship of
"domiciliation" or "residence" generally controlling in the
domestic relations field. There is much more than meets the eyes,
in this substitution. It quite generally is understood, however,
that "presence" means just that and nothing more.' The desir-
7On its face, Section 4 seems to attempt to change not only the enacting
state's law, in this respect, but that of another state as well-somehing
beyond its legislative competence. However, the number "2" interpreta-
tion avoids that conclusion.
'
8But this interpretation still contains a major departure from traditional
doctrine that, when F refers to a foreign created right, it will apply
that right subject to the same limitations as are imposed by the law
creating it. The 1952 Act avoids this objection by omitting reference to
the alternative law selected according to the "wife's presence." How-
ever, there is nothing to prevent the forum from legislating such choice
of law rule.
"Otterstedt, op. cit. supra, n. 76, at 232 ff.; Stimson, Simplifying the
Conflict of LaW8: A Bill Propo8ed for Enactment by the Congress, 36
A. B. A. J. 1003, 1005 (1950). One difficulty with constantly shifting
"presence," is the burden of proving "presence" in the past, affirma-
tively placed on the plaintiff. The 1952 amendment in Section 7 tries
to correct that, though, by raising a presumption of continuous presence
in the forum, shifting the burden to the defendant.
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ability of basing the jurisdiction ot the courts on "presence"
raises much less debatable issues than does that of selecting the
applicable "choice of law" on that ground. In addition to rais-
ing a very difficult practical problem, where the defendant has
been in many states in the interim, with none of those states hav-
ing any present governmental interest whatever in the litigation,
it is predicated on an extremely debatable thesis that all conflicts
issues should be resolved by selecting the law on an extreme "ter-
ritorial basis," illustrated in the present Act, by the use of "pres-
ence for the time being," as the basis for selecting the controlling
law. ' Though an extended discussion of the fundamental policy
question in the conflicts field is beyond the scope of the present
study, selecting the law on the basis of bare "presence" deserves
the most thorough critical examination before being accepted as
settled legislative policy.'
Another problem deserving more attention than it has re-
ceived so far, involves the question of whether a plaintiff with a
divorce and alimony, or a separate maintenance decree, is entitled
to bring an action under the Act, seeking to recover for all ac-
crued sums due. The very wording of Section 7 seems strongly
to suggest an affirmative answer. If the reference to the laws of
states where the defendant has been in the past is not to establish
the measure of his liability for the future, it must be to compute
a total accrued sum for which the defendant is liable, even in' the
8' Stimson, op. cit. 8upra, n. 79. 'Domicil' or 'residence' are the most ob-
vious alternative bases in the common law for selecting the controlling
law. RESTATEMENT, CONFLiCT OF LAWS (1934) Section 457. Granted
even that there are some difficulties in 'domiciliation', as the basis for
making the choice of law, and that it should not be used where there is
an acceptable alternate basis, 'residence' deserves serious consideration,
as the 'connecting factor' for selecting the applicable law. Probably it
indicates that law having the greatest legislative interest in a 'support'
case.
' Selecting the controlling law on the basis of 'presence for the time being'
may well greatly oversimplify the problem. Surely it gives little con-
sideration to the selection of that law with the greatest amount of gov-
ernmental interest. Cf.: Briggs, Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle
in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws, 6 VANDERBILT LAW REv. 667(Symposium on Conflicts) (1953) ; Briggs, The Juri8dictional--Choice-
of-Law Relation in Conflicts Rules, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1948). In
fact, much dissatisfaction with Section 7 as amended, even, continues
to be expressed generally. See, Reciprocal State Legislation to, Enforce
the Support of Dependents, op. cit. 8upra, n. 38, at page 22, where a
resolution by the Conference on Social Welfare and Non-Support, 1953,
urging the Commissioners to continue studying the choice of law prob-
lem, is set forth. In addition to the question of whether 'presence' is a
proper basis for making such choice, there is the further one of whether
It Is practicable in a single choice of law rule, to deal with both con-
tingent--depending on the indigence of the plaintiff, and absolute duties
-arising simply out of a relationship.
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absence of a formal decree. Lump sum awards are expressly
authorized for the benefit of all state welfare agencies. Further,
the definition of "duty of support" in the Act,' would seem to
the definition of "duty of support" in the Act, would seem to
compel that same conclusion, in so defining explicitly as including
duties raised by any kind of judicial decree, as well as by general
law. This definition plus the full faith and credit clause should
make any other conclusion impossible. Yet, in at least two district
courts in Montana, the position is taken that such relief is not
available. Furthermore, a standard form in use in Idaho, for a
complaint under the Act, based on a prior decree, where the court
had jurisdiction over the defendant, and reciting the past non-
payment, with resulting accruals, makes no demand, as of right
under the full faith and credit clause, for the accrued alimony,
praying instead for "such sums as shall be deemed just and equi-
table for the support, . . of the plaintiff and .. . children . .. "
This refusal to render a decree for past due alimony certainly can-
not be justified by the reason given by one Montana county attor-
ney, which was that the Act is 'quasi-criminal,' and to grant an
award for accrued alimony on a foreign judgment would be com-
bining civil and criminal remedies in one action, which is not per-
missible.
The preferable construction of the Act is that it intends to
provide a much more convenient method for the plaintiff to en-
force an alimony or maintenance award against a non-resident
defendant, by permitting suit to be initiated in the former's home
court, with the state assuming a major portion of the costs, in
proper cases. Indeed, this may well become one of the principal
virtues of the Act. Of course, the responding court may have a
duty to measure past due support by the original decree, with-
out having any such duty to so measure as to future sums due,
at the time of its decree. As to the latter sums, however, there
immediately arises the question of which decree takes precedence,
as payments become due, if the responding court refuses to im-
pose a duty measured by the award of the prior decree, awarding
instead, a lesser amount. Under the 1950 Act this could be a
very troublesome problem. However, Section 27 of the 1952 Act,
resolves that question by providing that each decree continues to
be operative, with payments on the lesser one to be credited on
the larger one. This Section should be interpreted as having
particular reference to duties of support, prospective at the time
of the responding court's decree.
-R.O.M. 1947, 94-901-2 & 6.
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We shall conclude this consideration of general problems of
substance raised under the Act by considering briefly the scope
of the defendant's right under Section 6 to avoid extradition by
submitting "to the jurisdiction of the court of such other state
and (complying) with the court's order of support." The re-
questing state may choose to seek extradition without initiating
a civil action. There is some tendency' to interpret Sections 5
and 6 of the Reciprocal Act as controlling any and all applica-
tions for extradition, for non-support, thus giving the defendant
the right to demand that the local court take jurisdiction for the
purpose of subjecting him to an order of support, with which he
can comply. Such construction is questionable, however. This
Reciprocal Act is operative, with all of its various provisions, only
between states, both of whom have enacted it. Section 6, itself,
is worded carefully in terms of the requesting (and initiating)
state: "Any obligor contemplated by Section 5, who submits to
the jurisdiction of the court of such other state and complies with
the court's order of support, shall be relieved of extradition for
desertion... entered in the courts of this state . . ." T~his Section
assumes that the other court is ready to exercise such jurisdiction.
The requesting state cannot compel the requested court to exer-
cise any such jurisdiction, except by qualifying under this Act-
and that only by initiating a civil action to accompany its request
for extradition. The Section is, in terms, a dispensation granted
by the requesting state, not by the requested one. Certainly it
could not be applicable in terms of creating any "rights" in the
defendant in a case where the requested state has not enacted the
Reciprocal Act. The entire wording of Section 6, in granting
the dispensation, assumes a case where the requested (and re-
sponding) court is ready to exercise jurisdiction in the civil
action as a matter of course, envisaging the initiating of such
action by the requesting state-and presumably limited to that
situation. Finally, this construction is most consistent with our
position that Sections 5 and 6, the only ones remotely relating to
criminal procedure, are included in this Act as supplementary
and incidental to the civil action to put more "bite" in the latter.
Hence, if the requesting state chooses to request extradition with-
out initiating a corresponding civil action, under its general ex-
tradition laws, neither the defendant nor his state can complain.
"One county attorney mentioned this particular problem taking the view
mentioned. At least two practitioners discussing it, were inclined to
the same view. Semble: Exparte Susman, 1953, 254 P. 2d 161, 116 Cal.
App. 2d 698.
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(Of course, such refusal may conceivably have some bearing on
the requested Governor's consideration of the case.)
FOUR ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
A brief discussion of some of the cases arising under the
Reciprocal Act, and called to our attention, should help to illus-
trate some of the conclusions on the Act, given above.
A Montana District Court received certified copies of a peti-
tion filed in Oregon under the Act, asking for support for a minor
child and of the Oregon court's "order" reciting that, "having
examined the foregoing Petition and other files herein, it finds
that the facts set forth therein are true and the D owes a legal
duty of support to his dependent," and requesting that the Mon-
tana court acquire jurisdiction over the defendant and proceed
with the trial. On the basis of this certification, the responding
court issued an order to the defendant "to appear and show
cause why he should not render support to his daughter," with
five days notice. Defense counsel secured a dismissal of the
action by advancing the following arguments: 1. It is a criminal
proceeding, and some of the defendant's basic rights in a criminal
trial are necessarily. violated in the procedure provided for by
the Reciprocal Act; 2. If it is a civil action, the initiating court
cannot make absolute findings of fact and render a judgment of
liability thereon in this personal action, as it purports to do,
without first acquiring personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
which it never had done in this case; 3. The mother was not a
proper party to bring the suit without first being appointed
guardian ad litem for the infant.
Though at least until recently, the Multonomah County
courts have continued to use the above form of certification, it
clearly is wrong. It is not surprising that that certification
should confuse the responding court, at first. It is true that the
initiating court cannot make any such finding as did the Oregon
court here, because it has never acquired any jurisdiction sup-
porting such "decree." Indeed, it may be profitable to compare
the above certification with that from a California form, a most
satisfactory one: "The undersigned .. . hereby certifies . . .
that said complaint sets forth sufficient facts from which it may
be determined that defendant owes a duty of support to the per-
son named therein.., and that in the opinion of the undersigned
Judge . . . , the defendant shauld be compelled to answer such
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complaint and to be dealt with according to law."' Although
very probably the court was greatly influenced by this certifica-
tion in dismissing-and understandably so-such action need not
follow from the faulty certification. Being within the exclusive
power of the responding court to determine whether the initiat-
ing court has qualified to request action of the responding court,
the latter may very properly give the effect to the certification
that a properly worded certification would be entitled to under
the Act, i.e., require the defendant to answer the complaint, as
is very aptly stated in the California form, above. Undoubtedly
the Oregon court itself expects no more. It would be a grievous
error indeed to proceed on the assumption that the Montana pro-
ceedings is a secondary or incidental stage of a suit over which
the Oregon court has already acquired jurisdiction. It would,
therefore, be equally erroneous to try to justify the issuance of
an order to show cause on the ground that the certification mere-
ly amounts to a motion incidental to a suit already begun.
We have said enough above to make it clear that, in our
opinion, the sufficiency of the order to show cause why the de-
fendant should not be required to support, as originating process,
is very doubtful. However, it might be issued auxiliary to a
summons, ordering him to show cause why he should not be made
to answer the complaint-this at least would be responsive to
California's certification form given above.
The question of whether the mother was entitled to sue to
recover for the support of the infant, in her own right, in this
action, has a dual aspect. Whether the mother, entitled to the
custody of the child by formal decree, is entitled to claim support
in her own right, from the father under the Act, must depend
on whether either choice of law permitted under Section 7 grants
her such right. If it does, she can sue in her own name. But,
even if it does not, giving the right to sue for support only to
the child directly, there still remains the further question of
whether the mother can sue in the responding state as natural
guardian, or has to be formally appointed guardian ad litem.
To answer this last question, the law of the responding state, as
forum, must control.' Experience seems to have established such
"mhe proposed uniform form, modelled on New York practice, puts it
more succinctly yet: "4. THAT in the opinion of the undersigned Jus-
tice the petition sets forth facts from which it may be determ'ned that
the respondent owes a duty of support and that such petition should be
dealt with according to law."
'Clearly this is a question of "procedure," traditionally regulated by the
law of the forum. RESTATEMENT, COiqLmOm oF LAWS, Section 588--
Parties (1934).
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appointment as a general requirement under the 1950 Act, be-
cause in Section 12, the 1952 Act expressly authorizes the person
entitled to the legal custody of the child to sue on its behalf with-
out formal appointment. Editorial comments states that this
was to remove the technical appointment requirement. Our own
Code likewise would seem to require it."
However, it is very arguable that the person with legal
custody, particularly where the mother, should be able to sue for
the support of the child in her own right, under our statutes and
decisions. Without suing for divorce, the wife may sue in her
own right to recover maintenance both for herself and minor chil-
dren, first judicially established,' and now re-affirmed by stat-
ute.' Further, if W, wife, has secured a divorce which provides
for alimony and support money, she is entitled to institute fur-
ther proceedings, in her own name, under that degree, seeking
modification either of alimony or support money for the chil-
dren.' Hence, if she has a divorce decree which fails to award
alimony and support money only for want of personal jurisdic-
tion over the father, there is every reason to allow her to sue in
her own right to adjudicate the question of duty of support.
This view is fully supported by our Code, under which the
right to custody at the outset is coequal between the parents,'
and the duty of support is likewise imposed on both parents where
needed."' This seems clearly to create reciprocal rights and
duties between the parents themselves with respect to support,
which, under the proper circumstances, should give either par-
ent a direct right of action against the other-until there is a
formal delimitation of those rights and duties by contract or
decree." The primary historical bar to such conclusion, the in-
ability of one spouse to sue the other has long since been repudi-
ated by our code."
8R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-2805.
OEdgerton v. Edgerton (1892), 12 Mont. 122, 29 P. 966, 16 LRA 94, 33
Am. St. Rep. 557.
'R.C.M. 1947, Section 21-137.
Refer v. Refer, (1936) 102 Mont. 121, 56 P 2d 750; Brice v. Brice (1915)
50 Mont. 388, 147 P 164; R.C.M. 1947, Sections 61-107, 21-137, 21-138,
21-139.
OR.C.M. 1947, Sections 61-105 and 61-106.
"Refer v. Refer, op. cit. supra, n. 88; Brice v. Brice, op. cit. supra, n. 88.
OEven here, such decrees are subject to constant modification in the in-
terests of the children. And a contract between parents is enforceable
only so long as not inimical to the best interests of the child: Brice v.
Brice (1915) 50 Mont. 388, 147 P. 164.
"Wife may own separate property: R.C.M. 1947, Section 36-111; hus-
band and wife may contract with each other with any third person,
R.C.M. 1947, Section 36-105, "married woman may prosecute action for
injuries to her reputation, person, property, and character, or for the
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In another case, suggesting something of the variety of ways
the Act may be invoked, the wife went to California with her
two children, ostensibly to visit her parents. Instead of return-
ing to Montana, as her husband expected, she remained in Cali-
fornia and sued for separate maintenance for herself and chil-
dren. Certifying in much the same way as did the Oregon court
in the above case, the California court concluded with, ". . . the
verified complaint sets forth facts from which it is determined
that the defendant owes a duty of support of the minor children
.. and that the District Court of ... Montana, may obtain juris-
diction over the defendant or defendant's property.''' Although
the Montana court misinterpreted this certification as gratu-
itiously trying to confer jurisdiction on the Montana court, it cor-
rectly gave the effect to the certification intended under the Act,
docketing the case for trial and subjecting the defendant to pro-
cess. On the trial, it became apparent that the wife was at fault
and so not entitled to separate maintenance. A decree was en-
tered accordingly. This case is of interest in that it supports the
suggestion made above that, even though the initiating court's
certification may be improperly worded, it should, nevertheless,
be given the legal effect intended for it under the Act, i.e., ef-
fectuating a filing of the complaint in the responding court. The
case also is suggestive of this phenomenon that it is by no means
always the man who does the abandoning. Very frequently the
wife leaves with the children, then tries to establish her right to
separate maintenance in a foreign jurisdiction.
Another California case is a slight variation on the above one.
Again, the wife left her Montana home and husband and went to
California. There she brought an action for divorce, simultane-
ously filing an action for "alimony" apparently, under the
Reciprocal Act. If the California Court hoped in this way to
cure its own want of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it
should not be necessary to point out that the jurisdiction in the
Montana Court would add exactly nothing to the California
Court's jurisdiction; so it still could not render any kind of
binding alimony or support decree. Further, the Montana Court
almost certainly would make a finding of fault in the wife, con-
enforcement of any legal or equitable right . . .", R.C.M. 1947, Section
36-110. Last Section has been construed as not entitling wife to sue
husband for personal injuries, however: Kelly v. Williams (1933) 94
Mont. 19, 21 P 2d 58.
"Italics supplied.
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trary to California's probable finding in the divorce action, re-
quiring a verdict in the defendant's favor.'
This last case is mentioned principally to illustrate what
gross misuse of the Reciprocal Act may be attempted-all the
more startling in this particular case because practiced by state
agencies. To paraphrase this judge: One case, from Los An-
geles, was not from any court. The Welfare Board had met
there, without any notice
to the husband who had been living in Montana for
years, and ex parte had determined that the husband
should pay hundreds of dollars in hospital, doctor, and
drug bills, stating an exact amount, and also declaring
that it would be necessary for him to pay over $100.00
per month for future support. They had the papers
certified by their chairman and secretary, and sent them
to the Court here. I did not consider that they met the
provisions of the law, but finally did issue a citation,
thinking that some kind of an agreement might be
reached if he were served. Hearing brought out these
facts. Defendant was living with wife in the Panama
Canal Zone when she deserted him. He had not lived
with her since, and had never lived in California. A few
months before this hearing he had secured a divorce
from plaintiff in Cascade County, Montana; she had
been represented in the divorce action by reputable at-
torneys; and agreement had been made, even though she
was the offending party, for the payment of monthly
sums for a stated period of time, the decree stating the
sums, and he had a receipt showing prompt payment of
all installments due.
It goes without saying that the Court dismissed the action. But
such cases as these latter ones fully justify an insistence that the
"If the divorce should be decided first, ruling in the wife's favor on the
issue of fault, does that become res judicata in the independent civil
action for support under the Reciprocal Act? Involving an issue (duty
to continue supporting) beyond the jurisdiction of the divorcing court to
decide, because of lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, its
finding on fault for divorce purposes cannot bind the defendant, in an
independent proceeding for support in a different court. Always true,
this conclusion has been made much clearer by recent United States
Supreme Court decisions developing the "divisible divorce" concept:
Estin v. Estin (1948) 334 U.S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561;
Esenwein v. Esenwein, (1945) 325 U.S. 279, 65 Sup. Ct. 1118, 89 L. Ed.
1608. See also Sutton v. Leib, (1952) 342 U.S. 402, 72 Sup. Ct. 398, 96
L. Ed. 448. Note the possibility of the divorcing court using a civil
action under the Reciprocal Act to secure evidence from the defendant
on the fault issue, (or any other issue common to both actions) if it so
desires.
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fullest opportunity for a trial on the merits, with all rights in-
cidental thereto, be preserved to the defendant.
EVALUATION
The cases just discussed are not cited as typical of those gen-
erally arising under the Act in Montana. Such Act seems al-
ready to have aided greatly in the more effective enforcement
of duties of support by migratory defendants in many areas.
It is difficult, however, to determine the total volume of support
money actually recovered, or the number of "successful termina-
tions" under the Act in proportion to the total number litigated
in Montana. It also is too early to pass final judgment on the
effectiveness of the divided trial procedure. A spot check indi-
cates considerable variation in the experience of different enforc-
ing offices. A county attorney in one of the larger offices reports
that, of some 12 cases initiated in that county, and sent to other
states, to date he has not received one cent as support money
from a single case." On the other hand, of about the same num-
ber in that county, enforced as the responding county, he has
secured a duty of support decree and the defendants have been
paying regularly to date, in all except one case, though the aver-
age weekly payments are quite small.
A judge from another district reports that, in the one case
he has initiated, the responding court has not effected personal
service. Of the seven he has handled as responding court, only
one has paid without further difficulty to date, though none has
contested, admitting liability readily, but most defendants are
of such character that collection poses a very serious problem.
Citations for contempt are becoming numerous, and some defend-
ants have left the state. On the other hand, a judge from still
another district reports some five or six cases pending at this
time, with every one of them contested bitterly. Still another
official reports that, although he has not carried any proceeding
under the Act into court, the bare existence of the Act has caused
several derelict fathers, refusing to pay, heretofore, to come for-
ward and pay without further protest.
Though these varying reports from different judicial dis-
tricts are too fragmentary, and our general experience with the
Reciprocal Act is altogether too incomplete to support any gen-
"Chancing to discuss this problem with an Oregon practicing attorney,
he reported that, of four cases he had personally initiated in the past
two years, for the plaintiff in Oregon, three to California, and one to
Utah, none of his clients has received one cent support money.
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eral conclusions as to its past, present or future value in Mon-
tana, we can make certain tentative conclusions that should aid
in correcting some of the short-comings found in the 1950 Act,
and also in making a further evaluation of the Act as we gain
more experience. The Act goes very far in eliminating the old
legal bars preventing the effective enforcement of duties of sup-
port across state lines removing that stigma on the law. It pro-
vides a simple, direct civil remedy for every obligee, initiated in
the easiest manner possible, with the further objective of doing
all of this at practically no expense to the obligee. Though this
last objective has not been entirely realized yet, much progress
has been made by the 1952 Act in shifting that expense to the
state wherever the obligee is indigent. Further, it establishes a
widely accepted rule permitting a state welfare agency to recover
from the defendant funds used to support his dependents. Such
rule seems highly desirable. These accomplishments alone justify
the Reciprocal Act. At least it can no longer be said that the
fault lies in the "law" or in "legal doctrine," enabling deserting
fathers to avoid their responsibilities simply by crossing state
lines. Legal doctrine now is fully adequate to meet the test,'
though the problem of on what basis the choice of law should be
made under Section 7 merits further careful study. Further,
there is little doubt that a very large portion of such obligors
will not contest a suit against them, and will accept the fact that
the law has "caught up with them."
However, as is always true, those who are constantly seeking
and expecting to find magical panaceas are doomed to disap-
pointment with this law also. The Act does not succeed in resolv-
ing all the difficulties inherent in this very complex sociolegal
problem. The maximum theoretical return that ideally should
be realized under the Act always will be seriously cut down by
these factors:
1. If the obligor has not re-married and assumed new fam-
ily ties and obligations, he is likely to be a migrant-a "drifter."
Rarely commanding a very large wage, he is ready to move on at
the drop of the hat, and he is likely to do just that. Yet, im-
posing criminal sanctions on him will not provide support. That
this problem already has shown up acutely is clear in Section 15
of the 1952 Act, which provides for his detention by arrest, before
trial if deemed necessary. But that does not keep him on the job
as a wage earner after the decree. So far, the discretionary pow-
er of the court to require the defendant to post bond for compli-
"Assuming the Act's constitutionality, mentioned infra.
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ance with the court decree has not produced very encouraging
results, at least in Montana. The possibility of subjecting the
obligor to more severe contingent criminal penalties, may merit
further study.
2. Almost without exception those persons who have become
so fixed that they can be relied upon to pay within their ability,
rather than to change their residence, are in this position precise-
ly because they have established a new family with all its re-
sponsibilities, and for that very reason, in terms of ability, cannot
do much. Naturally, and properly, the responding court takes
these facts into full account when it assesses the duty to pay,
often resulting in very meagre payments. After all, his duties of
support to his new local dependents are quite as urgent as those
coming from a distant state.
3. In considering the inherent difficulties arising from the
nature of the problem, and making the ideal administration of
the Act more difficult, the fact that it makes possible a great
many spurious claims may be included. Wives abandoning their
husbands frequently will try to compel him to support them
where they want to live, though the husband has a perfect defense
in such case. Again, probably all too often these same wives will
seek support from a present or former husband for a child which
is not even his. These tendencies will be aggravated by the de-
sire of local welfare agencies to shift the financial burden to pri-
vate shoulders. Recipients often will be pressured to file claims
when they have none, or to provide false evidence in support of
the agency's claim. It may surprise many to learn of the con-
siderable number of cases in which the husband has a perfectly
valid, defense. Desertion is by no means a one way street. This
makes it necessary that the defendant be assured a formal and
complete trial, with all those rules and practices aiding in the
discovery of truth preserved to him under the Act.
CONCLUSION
This discussion of the Reciprocal Act has been limited in
large part by current practices in Montana, and by the questions
and criticisms coming from the profession. We have not at-
tempted to consider numerous questions, both large and small.
To some, the most notable omission may be our failure to discuss
its constitutionality. But that issue lies outside the objective of
this paper, which seeks simply to understand the Act itself, and
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the procedure it calls for, as completely as we can.' Further, we
dealt not at all with the concluding sections involving the pro-
cedures for collecting and transmitting support money after de-
cree. Purely ministerial they do not pose the primary problems
under the Act.
As a result of this study, however, further positive legisla-
tive action in two directions seems clearly called for. The amend-
ed Act of 1952 makes such marked improvements that it should
be adopted without further delay. Secondly, as a corollary to
an enactment of this kind providing broad sweeping civil rem-
edies for everybody, where the defendant is without the state,
our legislature should remove all question as to whether these
remedies are equally available for the persons mentioned in the
Act, in a strictly local action. To answer in the negative would
produce a monstrous situation in the law. While courts probably
would be justified in finding a legislative policy expressed in the
Act necessarily including such remedies for strictly local actions,
the issue can be best resolved by a statute so providing. As
Vernier says:
". .. A civil statute meeting the needs above out-
lined (direct action for support) might advantageously
be adopted. Perhaps such action is contemplated by the
broad statutes herein discussed which do not provide the
means of enforcing the duty stated. If so, they are
faulty in not so specifying."
"It is believed that, properly construed, this Reciprocal Act will with-
stand attacks on its constitutionality. Brockelbank, the drafting com-
mittee's chairman, considers possible constitutional bases for attacking
the Act, and upholds it on all counts in, Brockelbank, Is the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act Constitutional?, 17 Mo. L. REv.
1 (1952), and 31 ORx. L. RaV. 97 (1952). A much more intensive con-
stitutional study also upholds its constitutionality: Otterstedt, op. cit.
8upra, n. 76, at 257 ff. The National Association of Attorneys General
has offered to make available supporting briefs amicus curiae, from
other states, at the request of any state, on behalf of reciprocal support
laws under attack on constitutional grounds. See action of 1953 Con-
ference on Social Welfare, op. cit. supra, n. 81.
94 VERNIER, AmERIcAN FAMILY LAWs 60 (1936). Out of such dis-
crepancies between the remedies given under the Reciprocal Act and the
varying remedies generally given, arises still another issue of interpreta-
tion-and of constitutionality. Otterstedt, op. cit. supra, n. 76, at 272 ff
insists this is the most challenging constitutional issue raised by the Act.
Many different kinds of remedies have become available for enforcing
support duties-though a direct civil action is least frequently author-
ized. An equitable action for maintenance of wife and children, the
imposing of criminal sanctions, liability to third persons for necessaries,
and statutes declaring certain duties of support by a policy declaration
without providing a remedy for its enforcement, are the most common
evidences of the existence of such duty. How must such duty be ex-
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pressed in the applicable law for the plaintiff to be entitled to civil
enforcement here? I always have felt that, if the applicable law recog-
nizes a legal duty to support, In any given case, as part of Its domestic
relations law, It should support an action under the act, however de-
ficient it may be in its enforcement machinery-even though it appears
to enforce only by criminal sanction, at least if the object of such sanc-
tion is to secure performance of the civil duty. The forum does not
thus enforce the foreign criminal statute, by imposing the same penalty
on the defendant, but rather only enforces the basic civil duty supplied
by the applicable law. Though not increasing the class of persons en-
titled to support, the Reciprocal Act expressly provides a remedy, ". . . In
addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies." Section 3.
If, however, there are sound policy reasons for the applicable law to
limit both the existence of the duty, and its enforcement to the criminal
law field, (which may be doubted) the forum should defer to that
policy, where found. Orthodon conflicts rules denying enforcement to
a foreign 'penal' statute would require that result.
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